the god: Dionysus (in the view of Euripides) is the spirit of unlimited and unbridled freedom both in nature and in man.

This definition may also serve to correct S.'s paragraph on 'Dionysus and the Human World' (pp. 92-100). He assumes a contrast between the mental condition of the unwilling worshippers, the Theban women, and the god's opponent, Pentheus, and that of Dionysus himself and his Bacchantes: the first is μανία, the latter σοφροσύνη. A willing worshipper never loses control of himself, whereas μανία "in most cases refers to a seriously deluded mental state which either approaches or attains to psychosis" (p. 94). S. admits, however (p. 139 n. 15), that at 130 the Satyrs are called μανίδες μενού "in rites akin to the Dionysiac". It should be added that the Theban women before they are disturbed behave themselves (686). These texts show that self-control is not the essential quality of a genuine Bacchante. S. seems to have felt this when he replaces 'self-control' by 'awareness' (pp. 96 ff.) 2). But this is not a correct translation of σοφροσύνη, and it certainly does not suit such passages as 329, 504 and 1341, nor are the eating of raw flesh (138) and the running dance (147-8) convincing signs of "a state of heightened consciousness" (p. 100). The fact that Pentheus is called 'sick' (311 οὐσεις) shows that 'mental sanity' is the dominant meaning of Bacchic σοφροσύνη: it suggests that it is natural for man to indulge in collective ecstasy. But Euripides uses the term as an oxymoron: unbridled freedom may induce peaceful happiness as long as it expresses itself in the surroundings of free nature, but as soon as it intrudes into civic life its lack of self-control leads to disorder and may degenerate into violence and cruelty.

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1) S. (p. 86) assumes a contrast between Dionysus as the immanent spirit of wild nature and Artemis as a transcendent power: "Olympian Artemis so transcends death that she cannot even watch her beloved votary die (Hipp. 1437)". But she could watch the death of Actaeon and the children of Niobe.

2) Although he still thinks that "self-control is implied in the orderliness of the dance" (p. 99). But 169 σαράθμασι does not exactly point to orderliness.


This lengthy book is a reproduction of the typewritten manuscript of Charpin's thesis, accepted by the Université de Paris IV in 1975. The author tries to find an answer to four specific questions (p. 24):

1. Is there a Latin word or expression that designates what we call 'sentence'?

2. If there is no such word, are there certain phonetic and syntactic properties which mark the Latin sentence as a linguistic unit?

3. How are such properties perceived and dealt with by grammarians and philosophers?

4. To what type of society does a society belong that ignores language as a syntactic ordering of words ('qui ignore le langage comme organisation syntaxique des mots').

The book is divided into four parts. Part I is related to the first question ('Le vocabulaire désignant la notion de phrase'; pp. 26-183). Part II ('La phrase comme unité prosodique'; pp. 184-343) and Part III ('L'ordre des mots et l'expérience de la phrase'; pp. 344-475) relate to the second question. Part IV ('La phrase comme unité syntaxique des mots') is intended as an answer to the third question. There is no explicit answer to the fourth question although some elements in part IV seem to imply such an answer.

1. In the introduction (pp. 4-25) Ch. defines the sentence as a finite sequence of hierarchically ordered morphemes (p. 14). The sentence can entirely and exclusively be analysed in syntactic terms (p. 21). Essentially, therefore, Ch. shares the view of transformational generative grammar that the sentence is the basic unit of communication (p. 22). It is not surprising to find after reading part I that this definition of the sentence cannot be found in antiquity either explicitly or implicitly. Ch.'s view, however, is only one of the views that can be found in the history of linguistics.

2. Part I is devoted to an analysis of the vocabulary referring to various aspects of linguistic expressions, such as sonus, vox, verbum, eloquium, oratio. Groups of seemingly synonymous words are described in terms of components of their meaning. Thus sonus is described as 'any sound whatsoever', vox as 'sound produced by human being' and verbum as 'smallest meaningful unit' (p. 72). The analysis of each group is clearly visualized in matrices. It appears, however, that Ch. makes many generalizations which lack support. The word vox, e.g., also denotes 'word' or 'statement' (cf. Cic. Fin. 2, 6). Ch. claims that the Romans had no idea of the concept of 'structure', but definitions of oratio (see now Thes. L.L. s.v. 879, 38 ff.), the concept of 'transitivity', expressions such as imperfecta oratio, and the very use of the words struere, structura point in the opposite direction. Apart from the componential description of these words Ch. also tries to find out whether they can be considered synonymous, by studying the occurrence of these words in various syntactic functions. We learn, e.g., that in Plautus oratio, sermo and sententia occur as subjects of intransitive verbs (p. 156). It is not clear, however, which conclusions might be drawn from this for the meaning of these words. It is certainly not the case that synonymy can be established by examining the syntactic environment only. In comparison with the Thes. L.L. Ch.'s description of the words involved has no value, in spite of the length of this part of the book. This is due to overstatement of conclusions and in part also to the limitations of this study to a few Latin authors (p. 34), viz. Varro, Cicero, Quintilianus, Charisius, Augustinus and Priscianus. Nonetheless the conclusion that there is no generally accepted, well-defined technical term for 'sentence' is correct.

3. Parts II and III are to a large extent quantitative and statistical. The studies of phonetic features of sentences, word order, etc. The corpus on which these studies are based comprises some 100 sentences from Plautus, Caesar, Cicero (Cat. and Corr.) and Augustinus each. In part II Ch. demonstrates that mono- and disyllabic words tend to occur in the beginning of sentences and clauses, and words of more syllables at the end, except in Augustinus, where shorter words occur at the end much more frequently (pp. 213-4).

4. In recent times non-transformational linguists point to phonetic and other not purely syntactic aspects of the sentence and to the dependency of the sentence upon the entire discourse (explicitly denied by Ch., p. 21), e.g. Pike 1971: 147; Lyons 1968: 172-80; Halliday & Hasan 1976: 1-2. Many Greek and Roman observations as well as their terminology can be understood within the framework of studies like these.
in view of the rules for accentuation in Latin. More interesting are Ch.'s observations on the correlation between the number of preaccentual syllables and the order of the words in which these preaccentual syllables occur (pp. 306-10). Thus in *divittam* there is one preaccentual syllable, in *esse* none. *divittam esse* presents a succession of 1 and 0 preaccentual syllables respectively. It is Ch.'s contention that the words in Latin sentences succeed each other in such a way that the number of preaccentual syllables either increases or remains equal. Also, Ch. holds that where this rule is not obeyed (that is, where the number of preaccentual syllables decreases) there is a natural pause (pp. 306-9). As in Ch.'s corpus the number of preaccentual syllables is as a rule higher in the end of sentences than in the beginning, this would imply, according to Ch., that the end of the sentence is—apart from syntactic indications—also marked phonetically. Ch. then compares the examples of clausulae in the Fragmenta Boiensia and observes that the examples in the Frg. Bob. all exhibit an increasing sequence of presyllabic syllables (e.g. *dictus orator*). The implication of all this would be that the Latin sentence, in spite of the supposed unawareness of the grammarians of its precise nature, is clearly marked as a unit by observable phonetic facts.

Part III is largely devoted to questions of the complexity of sentences and clauses, and the relative order of constituents. This topic is presented within the theoretical framework of Tesnièrean Grammar (p. 359). Within this framework sentences and clauses are analysed into a number of peripheral constituents ('circonstants', i.e. adverbials) on the one hand and the predicate and the nuclear constituents ('actants') that immediately relate to the predicate on the other (cf. Happ 1975). Thus in *pater hori dixit Caesarom mortuum esse* there are four constituents, namely one 'circonstant' (*hori*), a predicate (*dixit*) and two 'actants' (*pater*, *Caesarom mortuum esse*). Ch. shows (p. 365) that, in his corpus, sentences with more than six constituents do not occur. Another interesting observation is that the predicate and object are never separated by more than one noun phrase (though adverbs may intervene (p. 415)). Ch. also pays attention to the relative order of constituents in sentences (pp. 428 ff.). Thus he remarks (p. 423) that in sentences with three constituents the first place is much more often filled by a subject or adverbial than by a predicate or object. Finally, Ch. draws attention to the lack of cohesion between the constituents of a sentence (p. 462). In his opinion Latin sentences in which neighbouring constituents are syntactically related are exceptional. Thus *exercitum in hiberna dimisi* is said to be much more normal, in classical Latin, than *exercitum dimisi in hiberna.*

5. Parts II and III form the central part of Ch.'s book in as far as he tries to bring forward empirical evidence proving that in Latin there existed something like a sentence. The issues touched upon are very important. The differences between classical authors and Augustinus are remarkable and deserve further consideration. It is highly regrettable therefore that especially this empirical part of the book shows up very serious faults. I must be short and will confine myself to four types of mistakes.

Firstly, in a book with so many calculations, mistakes, typing errors, etc. cannot be avoided, but they tend to make the reader sceptical. A few examples. On pp. 187 and 223 the total number of for example sentences on p. 187 are not clearly related to those of pp. 365/6, and the totals of constituents on pp. 365, 390 and 366, 391 respectively differ in a way not clear to me.

Secondly, the statistical basis is insufficient. Ch. presents an impressive looking formula on p. 188 in order to show that the corpus he has chosen from various authors is representative in as far as the syllabic structure of the words is involved. But what is the value of an observation such as the one made on p. 440 to the effect that in sentences with 5 constituents we might theoretically expect 1045 possibilities of relative order of which the corpus actually exhibits 29, if we realize that in Ch.'s very restricted corpus there are only 41 such sentences (p. 365)? And what does this mean on p. 440 for a certain order of constituents in Cicero's *Caesarem mortuum esse*?

Thirdly, the results of this study cannot be judged in full because of the inadequate definition of concepts. Again a few examples. Ch. studies complexity of sentences within the framework of Tesnière. In this model it is a well-known problem to decide whether a predicate has 2 or 3 obligatory constituents in its frame. Ch. does not inform us about his own methods. Where he is a bit more explicit about the interpretation of the Tesnièrean model (p. 359) one wonders whether the analysis of sentences Ch. arrives at is very fruitful. It is hardly in the line of Tesnière to call each constituent that may be replaced by an adverb a 'circonstant', no matter whether it is an optional or an obligatory constituent. Also, it is awkward to find (p. 153) that a third actant is counted as a circonstant "par souci de clarté".

Ch. pays quite some attention to what he calls 'internal sequences' within sentences (pp. 221 ff.). The internal sequence is defined as a part of a sentence between two pauses. Ch. recognizes 403 sequences in the corpus of Plautus. The Budé edition, which Ch. has taken
for granted as far as punctuation of sentences is involved (and which differs from Lindsay's OCT, of course) yields some 225 sentential and intra-sentential punctuations (obvious syntactic boundaries such as coordination of clauses included). In order to explain the difference one may turn to pp. 306 ff., where Ch. gives a number of analyses of Latin sentences, e.g. animadvertiuis/ judices/ omne accusatorius orationem/ in duas/ divisam esse partes (Cic. Clu. 1). There is no evidence that the pauses assumed by Ch. are phonetic. There are, of course, syntactic breaks, so to speak, in as far as e.g. duas and divisam do not constitute a syntactic unit. Another line of explaining the assumed 403 internal sequences would be to depart from Ch.'s concept of 'preaccentual syllable' and the pauses Ch. assumes at those points between, and inside, sentences where the number of preaccentual syllables of succeeding constituents decreases (pp. 306 ff.). However, Ch.'s conclusion that decrease is normally to be expected between two succeeding sentences is an overstatement in view of the calculations he presents. Moreover, the application of the very notion of 'preaccentual syllable(s)' is difficult, since the rules for handling clitic words (pp. 252-6; cf. Appendix) are not very clear, and debatable at that. What are we expected to understand by "conjunctions placed before the words they govern" (p. 254)?

Fourthly, Ch. neglects qualitative aspects of sentence structure. Conjunctions and sentence connectors, e.g., mostly words of one or two syllables, are syntactically bound to a position at the beginning of a sentence. Similarly, in Latin, prepositions are normally bound to a position before the Head noun. There are, then, correlations between the observed increase in the number of syllables in words in a sentence, the increase of preaccentual syllables, and word order rules pertaining to certain categories of words. From Ch.'s book one might get the impression that Romans might choose between one, two, three and four syllable conjunctions, prepositions etc., which they might put anywhere, but, remarkably, did put in such an order that mono- and disyllabic words happen to be placed in front.

5. Part IV is essentially a chapter in the history of science, and especially the position of linguistic science in antiquity. There are paragraphs on the relationship between language and reality, on the influence of literary examples on linguistic studies, and the relationship between linguistics and philosophy. Ch. demonstrates, without saying so, that there are no signs that the ancient grammarians realized the difference between pragmatical and grammatical aspects of linguistic expressions. Linguistics played an important role for and was ancillary to the explanation of literary texts. Interesting is the survey of quotations of Latin authors in the Grammatici Latini (pp. 532-4). Virgil emerges as the most cited, whereas Tacitus is not cited even once. Ch. stresses (p. 579) the fact that, even if Aristotle refers to linguistic phenomena, he does so as a logician. He also finds that Priscianus' description of sentences derives from this logical point of view (p. 182). However, especially for someone working with Tesnière's model, Ch. overstates the distinction between a linguistic and a logical conception of the sentence.

This part of the book is certainly the best. Still I have some objections. My first objection is related to the above observation on Aristotle. Ch. has a very limited idea of what is linguistic and what is not. In fact, his theoretical position looks quite old-fashioned. By way of an illustration I refer to Ch.'s statement (p. 602) that the ancient philosophers did not see language as "being fundamentally an instrument of communication". Rhetoric, however, can be described to some extent as the study of the communicative aspects of language. From his position Ch. takes an unsympathetic view of classical linguistics; this leads to statements like "the ancients— whoever they may be—did not leave room for syntax" (p. 561) and "the ancients did not know what an inflectional morpheme is" (p. 527). Another objection concerns the elaborateness of exposition and the lack of discussion with other scholars in the field, e.g. Robins (1967).

7. Conclusion. This book deals with many interesting topics, but, regretfully, in a too elaborate and unsatisfactory way. Apart from the details given above, the author also seems not to have written about what others have to say about the topics he bothered to learn what others have to say about the topics he is writing about, especially if they are written in another language.

"À qui voudrait se faire une idée de la confusion qui devait régner dans la tour de Babel, on pourrait conseiller d’assister à un congrès ayant pour thème la nature du style, les buts et les méthodes de la stylistique". Voici un jugement d’Albert Maniet, qui ouvre le livre de M. Ax. L’auteur allemand s’efforce de mettre de l’ordre dans ce chaos scientifique en distinguant et en discutant quatre tendances principales dans les recherches stylistiques de la langue latine.

1. Discussion de la théorie de Marouzeau du style comme choix, suivie d’une analyse du *Traité de stylistique latine*. Plus d’un tiers du livre de M. Ax a été consacré à Marouzeau, dont les théories et le traité en tant que grammaire stylistique nous sont présentés dans des résumés assez laborieux. Le style de M. Ax lui-même est ici très dense et en même temps un peu prolixe puisqu’il donne à la fin encore une fois un résumé des résumés. L’auteur jette également un regard critique sur les parties stylistiques des grandes grammaires historiques du latin.

2. Rapports entre la stylistique et la rhétorique, dont il souligne l’importance pour reconnaître dans l’interprétation de la littérature ancienne l’aspect traditionnel et l’aspect individuel.